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The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, pronounced
“Reggie”) is the first regional mandatory program to address global 
warming pollution from power plants in the United States. In 
December 2005, after two years of planning, the governors of 
seven states (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, New York and Delaware)* signed a 20-page Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) adopting a plan for reducing carbon 
dioxide (CO2). A year later, the states released a draft model rule 
outlining regulations for participating state governments to use in 
RGGI’s adoption and implementation at the state level. RGGI will 
take effect in 2009, and mandate that total emissions in the RGGI 
states may not increase from 2009 to 2014, and then must fall by 
2.5% per year through 2018.
What are emission allowances?
Emission allowances are the currency of the emissions trading 
market set up by RGGI’s cap and trade system. One emission
allowance equals one ton of CO2 emissions. Maine’s total emis-
sions level is capped at 5.95 million tons, or 5.95 million allowances. 
Each regulated power plant must have sufficient allowances to 
meet its CO2 compliance levels. The state can auction or give away 
emission allowances, and power plants are free to buy and sell 
excess allowances under the cap. RGGI specifies that each state 
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must sell or auction at least 25% of the allowances, with the proceeds used for 
public benefit, but can decide individually whether to auction a greater 
percentage.
After a series of roundtable discussions across the state, the Maine Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (DEP) developed a bill for the 123rd legis-
lature to authorize implementation of the rule. One of the major provisions 
of this bill requires Maine to auction 100% of the emission allowances with an 
exception for co-generation plants (see below). 
This paper examines the following question: When the allowances are 
auctioned, how should the funds be used? 
How much revenue for public benefit will be generated?
The amount of funds available for public benefit depends on 1) the total 
number of allowances auctioned and 2) the cost of an allowance.
The bill (LD 1851) before Maine’s legislature supports the intent of generating 
a large pool of resources for public benefit programs, while acknowledging cost 
concerns of the regulated generators, specifically, the two plants within Maine 
that are combined cycle co-generation plants. By co-locating with an industrial 
plant (two paper companies in Maine’s case) steam produced as a by-product 
of the industrial process becomes an additional source of power. Often called 
combined heat and power (CHP), they are among the most efficient of electric 
generators. Under LD 1851, DEP would set aside a portion of the state’s 
annual allowances (lowering the number of allowances available for sale) to 
cover that portion of CHP emissions related to electricity generated for the 
manufacturing facility itself, and not transmitted to a distribution utility.
Even at the lowest estimated cost of allowances, the RGGI program will 
create a substantial new market. Maine’s allocation under RGGI is approxi-
mately six million emission allowances; cost on the open market is projected 
between $1 – $10 per allowance. If 85% of Maine’s six million allowances are 
auctioned (with approximately 15% set aside for co-generation plants1), at an 
average price of $2 – $5 an allowance, the state could conservatively expect 




Muskie School of Public Service
University of Southern Maine
www.muskie.usm.maine.edu
Thanks to Michael Stoddard, 
Environment Northeast, for 
reviewing and commenting on 
this paper.
Sections are drawn from 
“Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI): A Primer 
for Maine,” first published in 
October 2006 by the Muskie 
School and the Margaret Chase 





How should the proceeds be used?
Options for use of these new funds, and an under-
standing of their benefit to cost ratio, are integral 
components of RGGI’s future success. Proceeds 
from the sale of allowances can be used for energy 
efficiency programs, renewable energy develop-
ment, and direct consumer rebates that will protect 
electricity consumers against the possible costs of 
RGGI.2  The following are possible options for use 
of public benefit funds:
Energy Efficiency Programs 
Reduction of greenhouse gases appears particularly 
likely to occur through investment in energy effi-
ciency programs. By increasing spending on energy 
efficiency, RGGI could assist electricity customers 
in cutting their monthly bills by lowering electricity 
consumption without lowering services (installing 
energy saving light bulbs, high-efficiency refrigera-
tion or motors, etc.). 
RGGI modeling has examined impacts from
doubling current spending on efficiency programs 
in the nine original RGGI states (as is approximately 
projected to be the case in Maine). The analysis 
found that if such doubling were continued for 15 
years, the average household would see its elec-
tric bill fall by about $100 a year, or roughly 12%. 
Business customers would gain a similar savings.3 
For New England, the RGGI modeling suggests that 
efficiency programs could achieve electricity sav-
ings for about one third the cost of generating the 
same amount of power. In coming years, more than 
enough cost-effective efficiency potential is avail-
able to completely cancel out projected growth in 
electricity demand.4  
In addition to the regional forecasts for efficiency 
spending, initial data is available from the Maine 
Public Utilities Commission (PUC), and presum-
ably more analysis can be developed during the 
course of rulemaking proceedings that will supply 
the RGGI implementation details. Taking as a price 
Efficiency Maine
A look at Efficiency Maine, a program of the Maine 
Public Utilities Commission, provides an example 
of what might be expected from investments in 
energy efficiency. After four years of operation, 
Efficiency Maine is now a key partner for residen-
tial and business customers, fostering cost-effective 
electricity savings, reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and helping Maine businesses stay economi-
cally competitive. In essence, Efficiency Maine is 
now the statewide “efficiency utility” and has 
cumulatively, since 2004, saved 1,231,241 megawatt 
hours (MWh) of lifetime savings, equivalent to the 
annual electrical consumption of 180,000 Maine 
homes.
Efficiency Maine’s 2006 annual report (budget of 
$9.2 million) lists the following accomplishments:
4	74,759 MWh annual savings 
4	$53.9 million lifetime economic benefits for
 installed equipment 
4	2.7 to 1 program-wide benefit-cost ratio 
4	$0.029 per kilowatt hour (kWh) for efficiency
 savings 
4	700,000 compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs)  
 rebated
4	320,849 metric tons of lifetime carbon dioxide  
 (CO2) emission reductions last year.
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basis the marginal cost of generating excess power 
(which reflects how prices are currently set), the 
Maine PUC shows the relative expected increases 
in energy efficiency at different costs per carbon 
allowance over the next 20 years (Fig. 1). Although 
this is only illustrative and does not necessarily 
reflect actual prices, it is a reasonable approach that 
attempts to show the relationship between cost 
per megawatt and the effect of that price (and the 
dollars it would generate) on energy efficiency 
activity.5 The PUC analysis shows that, over a 20-
year period, energy savings and electrical cost 
increases roughly cancel each other out. For 
example, if allowances cost $2 per ton, savings will 
be greater than cost increases for most of the 
20-year period, and this effect will peak in 2016. If 
allowances cost $5 or $7 per ton, a similar 
pattern is observed but the cost is larger by a
factor of roughly 2.5 or 3, respectively. 
Tailored to Maine’s energy policy context, these 
data reinforce RGGI modeling results and suggest 
that, at several possible initial auction prices, invest-
ments in energy efficiency programs will lower 
costs for all customers and will deliver additional 
savings to individual program participants over time. 
Other (Non-electric) Energy Efficiency
Another potential use of RGGI auction proceeds is 
investment in non-electric energy efficiency 
opportunities, which would reduce consumption 
of other forms of energy by the end-user, such as 
natural gas, fuel oil, kerosene, propane. Cost-
effective energy efficiency opportunities include 
home weatherization, upgrading commercial and 
industrial heating and cooling systems, and 
promoting high-efficiency furnaces and boilers.  
The benefit to cost ratio of these non-electric 
efficiency programs in other states is typically 
higher than that experienced by electric efficiency 
programs, delivering between $3 and $4 of 
benefit for every $1 invested.  Increased efficiency 
in the economy’s consumption of natural gas can 
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Figure 1: RGGI Energy Cost Increase and Efficiency Savings
Cost based o  arginal CO2@ 1,100 lbs./MWh
100% of allowance value used for efficiency
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which, to the extent it is used in power plants that 
set the marginal price in the New England power 
pool, will also keep electric wholesale prices lower.  
Non-electric energy efficiency projects also 
deliver very significant reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions.  However, it should be noted that 
there is no direct link between the beneficiaries 
of the non-electric projects and the source of the 
RGGI funds (electricity customers), nor will the 
resulting reduction in demand for these non-
electric energy supplies help drive down the 
cost of RGGI allowances.  
Energy and sequestration research
Funds could also be directed to other programs 
with potential to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions or increase sequestration of carbon—such as 
support for renewable energy start-up firms and 
research in new alternative energy technologies. 
Funding clean energy technologies would stimulate 
or reward investment in the research and develop-
ment of new innovative carbon emissions abate-
ment technologies and promote renewable or 
non-carbon emitting energy advances such as wind, 
solar and geothermal power generation.  Funding 
for research on the carbon sequestration function 
of forests and agricultural lands and possible ways 
to establish eligible carbon “offsets” for improved 
management practices on these lands could simi-
larly achieve carbon reductions and deliver financial 
benefits to the local economy.
Rebates
A portion of revenues generated from the sale of 
allowances could also be allocated to directly 
reduce impacts from the RGGI program on 
electricity bills. This approach could be designed 
to credit all customer classes in proportion to the 
amount of electricity they consume. It is also 
possible to target rebates only for the most vulner-
able customer groups, although this can be difficult 
to implement. Electricity rates send signals to 
consumers (lower rates or rebates tend to increase 
usage), so care must be taken not to undermine 
the conservation incentives that are a critical aspect 
of RGGI. Another option is to provide a fixed 
rebate per household (not a rebate that rises with 
consumption level) so that the consumer can 
pocket any savings achieved from reduced 
consumption.
However, because there is a finite supply of funding 
from an auction of RGGI allowances, every dol-
lar spent on a rebate is one less dollar that can be 
spent on energy efficiency.  A dollar allocated to 
rebates saves some customers one dollar, but deliv-
ers no additional benefit in the form of reduced 
energy consumption, no lowered demand for RGGI 
allowances, nor any additional greenhouse 
gas reductions.
Combined approaches
States may make their own decisions of how much 
of the revenue generated should be spent on 
which option. One hybrid option is threshold 
pricing. In this model, auction proceeds are 
allocated to energy efficiency programs up to 
a certain price per ton, and any additional proceeds 
are allocated to one or more of the other options. 
For example, in Maine, LD 1851 from the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (DEP) suggests 
that up to an auction price of $5 a ton, 100% of 
the proceeds be spent on efficiency programs, and 
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any amount obtained at auction prices over $5 a 
ton will be spent on rebates to electric ratepayers 
based on usage. This strategy attempts to protect 
the consumer from possible cost increases brought 
on by the higher cost of emission allowances.
Conclusion
When implemented, RGGI will reduce greenhouse 
gases, produce new funds for the public benefit, 
and provide an opportunity to help shape Maine’s 
economic future. As described above, RGGI 
auction proceeds, based on current analysis and 
past efforts, will most productively be invested
in energy efficiency projects. There appears to be 
ample room for increased energy efficiency that 
will:  
• Reduce overall demand for electricity (which
 in turn will reduce demand for, and cost of,
 RGGI allowances, benefiting all customers) and
• Encourage consumers to reduce their carbon
 emissions, so that any increase in energy   
 prices could be more than offset.
To date, analyses of energy efficiency measures 
have focused on their affect on electricy costs and 
CO2 reduction. They do not address the question 
of whether any portion of the proceeds allocated 
to research in new renewable energy technologies, 
or to customer rebates, would produce a compa-
rable reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
Whether threshold pricing is approved or not, 
policymakers should require an analysis from the 
PUC of whether rebates—and other possible uses 
of auction proceeds—do, over time, achieve the 
public purposes intended. 
The RGGI states are being closely watched6 and 
standards are being set for the country to follow. 
Keeping the public benefits of RGGI at the 
forefront of upcoming policy discussions will be 
critical in helping Maine and other states adapt to 
the changing economy in a carbon-constrained 
world.  At the same time, using the RGGI funds 
wisely can help the state manage and reduce 
energy costs while lowering total greenhouse gas 
pollutants. 
Endnotes
1. This is currently proposed in LD 1851, in order to incentivize energy 
efficiency at cogeneration plants.
2. See, for example, slide 4 of L. Petraglia and D. Breger, “REMI Impacts for 
RGGI Policies based on the Std REF & Hi-Emission REF”. November 17, 2005. 
(www.rggi.org/docs/remi_stakeholder_presentation_11_17_05-final.ppt)
3. Lifetime economic benefits and the benefit-cost ratios are calculated by 
estimating the total lifetime electricity reductions of the efficient products 
multiplied by future avoided energy costs and adjusted for total program and 
participant costs all discounted to the present year. 
4. The average Maine residential customer consumes 6,817 kWh per year. 
Energy Information Administration, 2004. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/elec-
tricity/esr/table12.xls. 
5. Data from the Maine Public Utilities Commission, April 2007.
6. As one example, on June 20-21 2007 there will be a “Renewable Energy 
Finance Forum” on Wall Street, during which finance analysts, entrepreneurs, 
and state policymakers from around the country will discuss RGGI as a 
potential model for other groups of states to follow, and prospects for a na-
tional versus a regional cap and trade market. (http://www.euromoneyenergy.
com/default.asp?page=13&eventid=ECK162&site=energy)
